Speaking about the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Armenian Prime Minister Ararat Mirzoyan told reporters on May 9 to expect “good news.” Meanwhile, the situation around Armenia remains tense. The Armenian Defense Ministry reports firing from Azerbaijani military positions toward its border villages. The issue of impeaching Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has been actively discussed in Armenia over the past month. Armenia’s parliamentary opposition insists that the prime minister should step down, but the ruling Civil Contract party remains confident that it will maintain a majority in the upcoming 2026 National Assembly elections. However, in March, the mayoral elections in Armenia's second-largest city, Gyumri, were won by Vardan Ghukasyan of the Communist Party. Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract faction boycotted the vote, which saw opposition forces backing Ghukasyan. Political analyst Manvel Sargsyan shares his views on the issues unfolding in and around Armenia, as well as the challenges and potential developments facing the country.

Domestic political life in Armenia was stirred in April by the mayoral elections in Gyumri. The ruling Civil Contract candidate was defeated, and Vardan Ghukasyan, a communist who begins his speeches with the Lord’s Prayer and believes Armenia should form a union state with Russia, was elected mayor. What is happening in Armenia’s domestic political life?

The situation in Gyumri is evidence that nihilism has grown even stronger in society. You may recall the movement initiated by Archbishop Bagrat a year ago, which aimed to mobilize the public but fizzled out in a confusing manner. There is dissatisfaction and protest in society, but it lacks clear articulation, which is why that movement faded away. Gyumri’s outcome reflects this. People have an abstract dissatisfaction—they are simply unhappy with everything, from the Karabakh issue to internal security and beyond.

This is not the first time this has happened in Armenia. We’ve often seen apolitical figures gain an advantage. When an apolitical environment emerges—when parties are weak and have little to say—society rejects both the authorities and the opposition. This leads to mutual accusations, and the core issues get lost. As a result, a third party, like Ghukasyan, emerges. In Gyumri, he is known as an experienced figure with a criminal background. He is skilled at navigating such situations, adept at convincing people, and understands both the political establishment and the public better than others. When the oligarchic system began forming in 2003, similar figures rose to prominence on a larger scale, entering parliament. The same phenomenon has now occurred in Gyumri. People voted for him simply to oppose the ruling power.

There is much discussion about the impeachment of Nikol Pashinyan, who recently visited Moscow to attend the Victory Parade, while we hear reports of shootings in border villages and a tense situation in Armenia. If Pashinyan is removed, could this tension, if not resolved, at least be alleviated?

This is a complex issue, and Armenia must realize that it’s not about who leaves but who comes to power. When the third president, Serzh Sargsyan, left, Pashinyan rose to power through the Velvet Revolution. Pashinyan could have pursued different policies, and events might have unfolded differently since he had significant public support, but things turned out as they did. If Pashinyan is impeached and leaves, the critical question is who replaces him and with what policies. Everything depends on that, not on Pashinyan himself.

However, a government defeated in war cannot remain in power—it’s dangerous. Pashinyan’s ability to constantly scare and manipulate the public with the threat of war stems from this. A defeated government will cling to power at all costs. One way or another, Pashinyan will eventually leave, but that doesn’t mean security or relations with Azerbaijan, Turkey, or Russia will fundamentally change. Everything depends on how the new government presents itself. Today, we don’t know who might come to power or what they can offer the people. No one is making promises. All we hear is that Pashinyan is a traitor and must go. But what if the replacement is even worse? Previously, Pashinyan labeled Serzh Sargsyan a thief and corrupt, and now the same accusations are directed at him.

We understand Pashinyan is corrupt and must leave, but the critical question is who should replace him. The problem is that Armenia lacks an established opposition with a clear ideology and program. That’s why people are talking about the need for new, young political forces, but it’s uncertain whether they will emerge. Even if new forces appear, we need to understand their programs and values. There’s no guarantee that a new political force will bring radical change to Armenia. The one who replaces Pashinyan might bring even greater problems. This is a serious issue.

Minister of Justice Srbuhi Galyan announced that a new draft of the Constitution will be ready in 10 months. Some claim this is Azerbaijan’s demand, while others deny it. What’s your view?

Since 2018, the current authorities have been saying the Constitution needs to change because the situation has shifted dramatically. At the same time, they claim the political system will remain unchanged. But if the political system doesn’t change, what does?

In 2015, third president Serzh Sargsyan amended the Constitution to extend his rule, transitioning Armenia from a presidential to a parliamentary system. The current authorities are attempting something similar but struggle to convince the public that this isn’t at Azerbaijan’s behest. Taking advantage of the situation, Azerbaijan demands constitutional changes, putting Armenian authorities in a difficult position. If the people vote “no,” what will they tell Azerbaijan? They might say, “We want to change it, but the people are against it—what can we do?”

The public sees no point in these changes and believes Azerbaijan is driving the demand, which they oppose. The authorities can do little about it. Despite their efforts to convince the public and their acceptance of all of Azerbaijan’s demands, they’ve achieved nothing in establishing peace.

What stage is the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan at, the text of which neither society has seen?

No one believes in that document. The authorities simply want to sign something to be remembered in history as having done “important” work or to use it as leverage in elections to show what they’ve achieved. There’s nothing serious in that document. Azerbaijani officials, including the Foreign Minister, have repeatedly stated it’s not a peace agreement but merely proposals for further negotiations. Azerbaijan’s position is that Armenia must accept these 17 points to continue talks on more critical issues. Azerbaijan will never sign that document.

Armenian authorities hope Aliyev will sign, expecting pressure from the international community, but Aliyev dismisses such pressure, saying, “Who are you to dictate terms?” No one can force him to sign. Those 17 points are about Armenia accepting everything Azerbaijan has done since 2020. Azerbaijan could add 27 more points, and Armenia might agree, but Azerbaijan doesn’t need that. It’s not about satisfaction—it’s about ensuring Armenia doesn’t gain leverage. Any signed document, even one of capitulation, implies mutual obligations, which Azerbaijan avoids. Armenia hoped for a signed peace deal, but its concessions have yielded no results.

Yet, many people, including experts, argue there’s no alternative but to continue this path, hoping Azerbaijan will eventually sign. This mindset isn’t limited to the peace agreement—it was prevalent during the 2020 war and has deep roots in Armenia.

Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said on Armenian public TV that the balance of power must be restored to protect against future Azerbaijani attacks. The Armenian authorities have announced they are buying weapons from India and France, which Azerbaijan condemns, while Azerbaijan continues to buy from Israel and others. What can you say about this?

Yes, you need a strong army, but strength isn’t just about weapons—that’s a misconception. Real power lies in alliances. Azerbaijan’s strength doesn’t come from its weapons alone. Aliyev has repeatedly said he built alliances with Russia, Turkey, Israel, and Pakistan. This coalition provided political protection, allowing Azerbaijan to use military force without opposition. This is hard for Armenians to grasp. They think weapons from France will counter this alliance, but that’s a delusion. You can buy as many weapons as you want, but the key is having allies who support you when you act. A state needs a punitive army, and when Aliyev orders an attack, he should fear severe consequences. Armenia must first build political strength through alliances. Israel is a prime example.

Which countries could Armenia ally with?

Syunik exists today because of Iran, not Armenia. When Russia made claims about its interests in southern Armenia, Iran’s president immediately responded, asserting Iran’s rights in the South Caucasus. Russia then began negotiating with Iran. That’s how it works—someone must stand up and assert their position. Stable alliances are crucial, built on mutual interests, not just Armenia’s needs. When alliances serve only one side, they fail, as seen with Armenia and Russia. When Russia prioritized relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, it betrayed Armenia. The same could happen to Azerbaijan.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, during the inaugural EU-Central Asia Summit, announced that opening Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan after three decades of closure would transform connectivity across Eurasia. While this seems unrealistic for now, if borders were opened, what role would this play for Armenia, and how would Iran respond, considering it has called border changes a red line? Could that red line turn green?

Armenia should have a role, like Azerbaijan and Turkey, benefiting economically and participating in decisions. But what if Azerbaijan takes territories, particularly Zangezur, and denies Armenia’s sovereignty? Aliyev has repeatedly claimed Armenians have no right to a state in the region, calling it Azerbaijan’s land. If von der Leyen’s vision aligns with Azerbaijan’s, Iran’s reaction could be unpredictable. Opening roads through Syunik under Armenian control would mean recognizing Armenia’s sovereignty, which Azerbaijan rejects, asserting it has resolved all issues by force and will continue to do so.

Von der Leyen envisions a rosy scenario where everyone applauds her vision of connectivity to Europe. But how would it work? She might hope Turkey and Azerbaijan enforce it, leaving Europe out of direct involvement. It could happen, but it could also backfire entirely.

Why is Ilham Aliyev so keen on disbanding the Minsk Group, something Pashinyan seems not to oppose?

Pashinyan doesn’t oppose anything. Azerbaijan might even raise the issue of Yerevan’s status someday. If not for Iran’s influence, that issue might already have been “resolved.” Syunik’s fate isn’t decided by Armenia alone—others must be considered. The Minsk Group represents the internationally recognized Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It acknowledged Armenia and Azerbaijan’s independence but required them to resolve the Karabakh issue within its framework, signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey. This worries Aliyev. While he might erase Armenia’s Foreign Ministry archives, he can’t erase the Minsk Group’s records.

Could the Minsk Group be dissolved?

It could, if Pashinyan agrees. But that’s not a new issue. If the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is erased, Aliyev would claim it was an occupation, demanding $150 billion in compensation. The Minsk Group prevents such narratives, stating that Azerbaijan entered disputed territory and must resolve its status. Pashinyan is now conceding even this, but Azerbaijan still won’t sign the peace agreement. It’s an ironic deadlock—Pashinyan seeks his own capitulation, but Azerbaijan refuses to sign, as even a capitulation document implies recognition, which Azerbaijan avoids. The Minsk Group issue is significant.

Pashinyan once said he’d dissolve the Minsk Group only if Azerbaijan doesn’t bring war to Armenian territory. What could Aliyev say to that? Agree? It’s absurd. This deadlock stems from Pashinyan renouncing Armenia’s rights.

Is the return of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians possible? In Armenia, this issue is often sidestepped, focusing instead on social problems. You say the chapter isn’t closed, and the international community keeps it open. While discussions about return continue, Karabakh Armenians in Armenia face social challenges, and many have emigrated. Some dream of return, while others are skeptical. Will they return, or will they live with longing, like the Armenian Diaspora?

First, you must secure the right, then find ways to protect it. After that, Aliyev’s opinion becomes irrelevant. For 26 years, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic existed, visited by foreign ministers from Iran and Europe in the 1990s. Why? Because Armenians held the right, and the status needed clarification.

Nagorno-Karabakh was more sovereign than Armenia, with its own army and billions in weapons, unlike Armenia, whose borders are guarded by Russian troops. Aliyev was shocked at their arsenal, wondering how “these poor people” acquired it. That’s politics—representing interests effectively.

Can Karabakh Armenians build such a policy now? The world supports their rights—there are international court decisions and European resolutions—but can they represent their interests? There are more opportunities now than during the Soviet collapse. The world is changing. Tomorrow, Azerbaijan or Armenia might not exist, nor might Iran. Look at Syria or Gaza. Many think Armenia can endure like this, but Pashinyan was ignored at the Moscow Victory Parade and in the U.S., even by the Armenian Diaspora.

Armenia is like a tree struck by an axe. Karabakh Armenians should learn from this. They’re given platforms from Europe to the U.S.—don’t focus on Armenia, which may not exist tomorrow. Where will they live then?

Interview conducted by Marut Vanyan